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SIXTH CIRCUIT DEFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF NOTICE
IN EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS:
A COMMENT ON TILLMAN V. MACY’S, INC.
By
Caroline Myrdek*
I.  

INTRODUCTION

In Tillman v. Macy’s Inc.1 the Sixth Circuit clarified the employee notice
requirement in work place arbitration agreements.2 The court conducted a fact focused
review of the case before it in order to limit its prior holding in Hergenreder v. Bickford
Senior Living Group.3 The court overruled the district court and found sufficient evidence
within the language of brochures and mailers to conclude that the Plaintiff, Tillman, had
been provided sufficient notice of an opt-out arbitration agreement with Macy’s.4 The
Sixth Circuit’s deferential treatment of opt-out arbitration agreements in the employment
field will likely encourage other businesses to follow the lead of Macy’s and adopt optout arbitration procedures for all possible suits arising from employment.
II.  

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Tillman, became a Macy’s employee in May 2005 when her previous
employer, May Department Stores, merged with Macy’s.5 After the merger, Macy’s
introduced the new employees to its Solution InSTORE program, a dispute resolution
system.6 The program was a four step process with the fourth and final step consisting of
binding arbitration.7 Employees could opt-out of the fourth step without penalty.8
Macy’s educated its employees about the Solution InSTORE program in several
different fashions. First, Macy’s sent an informational mailer to the employees’
residences.9 Next the employees attended an informational session where they watched a
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video on the program, and a confirmation mailer was sent afterwards.10 Finally, an
electronic form on the program was sent.11 Furthermore, at the session, employees
received an informational brochure on the Solution InSTORE program.12
Although Tillman stated that she never received the mailings, they were sent to
her address and were not returned as undelivered.13 Tillman admitted to attending the
informational session when the video was shown.14 Tillman had the opportunity to fill out
the opt-out paperwork several times, but failed to do so.15 Since Tillman did not opt-out,
she received an electronic communication confirming her enrollment in the program and
provided further information on the Solution InSTORE program as well.16
Tillman filed a race discrimination suit against Macy’s in the district court for the
Eastern District of Michigan based on an alleged violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 after her termination of employment in 2009.17 Macy’s then filed a motion to
compel arbitration and to stay the action pending arbitration.18 Macy’s argued to the
district court that arbitration should be compelled in accordance with the Solution
InSTORE agreement in place between Tillman and Macy’s.19 Tillman argued that the
opt-out system in the Solution InSTORE program “did not amount to an offer to enter
into an agreement to arbitrate, and that she did not accept any such offer.”20 The district
court agreed with Tillman, relying heavily on the prior Sixth Circuit case of Hergenreder
v. Bickford Senior Living Group, LLC21 and denied Macy’s motion to compel
arbitration.22
Since Tillman stated that she did not read the Solution InSTORE program, the
district court held that “Tillman did not knowingly and voluntarily waive her right to a
jury trial.”23 The district court also denied Macy’s motion to stay proceedings during the
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appeal.24 Macy’s then filed a motion with the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to
stay the trial proceedings during the appeal, and the court granted that motion on June 19,
2012.25
III.  

COURT’S ANALYSIS

The Sixth Circuit began its analysis by stating that only “[a] limited review is
required before compelling an unwilling party to arbitrate.”26 The court then stated that
since arbitration agreements are a special kind of contract, it would “review the
enforceability of [the] arbitration agreement according to the applicable state law of
contract formation."27
A.  Macy’s gave ample notice of its Solution InSTORE program to Tillman.
The Sixth Circuit disagreed with the district court and held that Macy’s did
adequately notify Tillman of the arbitration program. Although Tillman alleged that she
did not receive the mailers, the court proceeded “on the assumption that she received the
materials sent to her, because properly addressed and posted mail is presumed to have
been delivered and received by the person to whom it was addressed.”28 Tillman also
argued that while she was present at the meeting where the informational video was
shown, the process was “breezed over.”29 The court countered Tillman’s statements with
the fact that she was given brochures regarding the process and was even encouraged to
conduct her own research on arbitration.30
The court also relied on the actual language of The Plan Document, finding that it
was clear and informative on the rights of the employees and the nature of the
agreement.31 Further, the court found that the language the program directly stated how
employees could opt-out of the program by signing and returning the form.32
The Sixth Circuit also disagreed with the district court’s interpretation of the
notice requirements in Hergenreder.33 The court emphasized the factual distinctions
24

Id.

25

Id.

26

Id.

27

Tillman, 735 F.3d at 456; see also Seawright v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 507 F.3d 967, 972 (6th Cir.
2007).
28

Id. at 457 n.1.

29

Id. at 455.

30

Tillman, 735 F.3d at 457.

31

Id. at 459.

32

Id.

33

Id.

124

between the arbitration agreement in Hergenreder and in the Solution InSTORE
program.34 In Hergenreder, the “dispute-resolution policy [] was not provided by the
employer or made available save for a vague reference in an employee handbook that did
not explicitly mention arbitration.”35
The court likened Tillman’s case to the case of Mannix v. County of Monroe,36
where an employment arbitration agreement was enforced.37 In Mannix, the County
“posted the revised [employment policies] at least four months before the [plaintiff's]
termination . . . on an internal database available to employees [and held] meetings
between department heads and employees and put the policies on the County's email
system.”38 The court concluded that the discussions in both Hergenreder and Mannix
supported its holding that Macy’s provided sufficient notice to Tillman to which Macy’s
demonstrated its intent to enter into an arbitration agreement with Tillman.39
B.  Tillman’s conduct following the communication of the Solution InSTORE
communications constitute acceptance of the arbitration agreement.
The Sixth Circuit stated that “[t]he manifestation of mutual assent may be made
wholly or partly by . . . acts or conduct.”40 The court further noted that there is much
support in Michigan case law that an offer may be accepted through continued
employment.41 Therefore, Tillman’s conduct after receiving the communications of the
offer demonstrably suggested that she assented to the arbitration agreement by continuing
her employment and not returning the opt-out form at any point during her employment.42
The court stated that “[t]he burden was on Tillman to show that she did not
voluntarily and knowingly waive her right to a jury trial.”43 The court used the plain
language of the agreement to find that Tillman did not meet her burden, and that the
district court erred in finding otherwise.44 The Plan Document stated in part:
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By agreeing to arbitration, the Associate and the Company agree to
resolve through arbitration all claims described in or contemplated
by Article 2 above. This means that neither the Associate nor the
Company can file a civil lawsuit in court against the other party
relating to such claims. If a party files a lawsuit in court to resolve
claims subject to arbitration, both agree that the court shall dismiss
the lawsuit and require the claim to be resolved through the
Solutions InSTORE program.45
The Sixth Circuit concluded that “because the information conveyed in the Plan
Document and brochure was part of a valid offer, and because Tillman accepted that offer
by continuing her employment at Macy's without returning an opt-out form, it follows
that Tillman knowingly and voluntarily assented to all of its terms, including this clearly
stated waiver of the right to trial by jury.”46
C.  Tillman knowingly and voluntarily waived her prospective civil rights claims
through Macy’s Solution InSTORE program.
The Sixth Circuit used five factors to evaluate if there had been a knowing and
voluntary wavier of prospective civil rights claims:
(1) plaintiff's experience, background, and education; (2) the
amount of time the plaintiff had to consider whether to sign the
waiver, including whether the employee had the opportunity to
consult with a lawyer; (3) the clarity of the waiver; (4)
consideration for the waiver; as well as (5) the totality of the
circumstances.47
Under the first factor Tillman argued that her high-school education was
insufficient to provide the “experience, background, and education” necessary to
knowingly waive her rights.48 The court rejected Tillman’s argument by emphasizing that
the plain language of the agreement was written in a non-technical, easily
comprehendible fashion.49
The court also stated that one factor alone is not dispositive.50 Under the second
factor, Tillman had over a year to opt-out of arbitration.51 Under the fourth factor,
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Tillman made no argument for lack of consideration.52 Lastly, under the totality of the
circumstances, considering the specific factual circumstances of the case, the court found
that Tillman had made a knowing and voluntary waiver of her prospective civil-rights
clams.53
Before concluding, the court noted that “opt-out schemes for accepting arbitration
contain a risk greater than in opt-in systems that some employees do not know what they
have agreed to.”54 But the court added that under Michigan law and under the
circumstances in this case, the opt-out system was sufficient.55 The Sixth Circuit reversed
the denial of the motion to compel arbitration and remanded for further proceedings
consistent with its opinion.56
IV.  

SIGNIFICANCE

As arbitration continues to grow in the United States as an effective alternative to
litigation, businesses such as Macy’s have been quick to adopt arbitration agreements
with their employees. The Sixth Circuit has addressed the issue of “notice” in
employment-related arbitration agreements several times in the past few years,57
demonstrating the importance of adequate notice for adhesive arbitral contracts. This line
of cases has established that the Sixth Circuit will take a highly factual look into the
circumstances surrounding the arbitration agreement, concentrating on the fundamental
fairness of the situation.
The Sixth Circuit focuses on general feelings of fairness and clarity when
determining if an employee was given sufficient notice, in other words, whether it would
be fair to enforce the agreement against the employee. In Tillman, the Sixth Circuit went
into great detail about its prior holdings regarding notice. Emphasizing that its holding in
Hergenreder was confined to its facts, employees were not directly told about the
arbitration program.58 This limiting focus on prior adverse case law points to the
emerging, expansive view of adequate notice for the Sixth Circuit.
The Sixth Circuit only took two sentences in its entire opinion to address an
alternative to an opt-out agreement, an opt-in agreement.59 The court took a timid stance,
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indicating that there is inherently more risk in opt-out agreements. The risk is that a party
will be bound by an arbitral agreement that the party was not aware of prior. But the court
stated it could not say opt-out agreements are insufficient under Michigan law, thereby
indirectly supporting the use of opt-out agreements in the state of Michigan.60
In-house attorneys for corporations will likely point to this language for support
of their choice to make opt-out arbitration clauses common in employment contracts. The
only viable defense left to those opposing opt-out employment agreements is to argue
lack of notice. This lack of notice can be due to unfair procedures by the opposing party
that do not sufficiently educate and inform the opposing party of the arbitral agreement.
This defense has been limited by the Sixth Circuit.61 If the minimum notice requirements,
as stated in Tillman, are met the “lack of notice” defense will not prevail.
Not only will there be an increase in employment arbitration agreements, there
will be an increase in employment arbitration. The Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Tillman will
further provide support for the growing involvement of arbitration in the world of
business.
V.  

CRITIQUE

The Sixth Circuit decision in Tillman addressed several aspects of arbitration.
First, the court discussed the issue of jurisdiction, the decision of whether or not an
arbitral agreement exists. Next, the court discussed at length the process and procedures
used by Macy’s in order to notify its employees of the Solution InSTORE program, this
program was in essence an adhesive arbitral contract.62Lastly, the court briefly discussed
the advantages and disadvantages of opt-in and opt-out arbitral agreements. Although the
Tillman decision was informative on the issue of notice in adhesive arbitration contracts,
questions still remain regarding what in fact qualifies as adequate notice.
A.  Jurisdiction in Tillman was not determined under kompetenz-kompetence.
The decision in Tillman involved the threshold question of whether an arbitration
agreement existed. Under the principle of kompetenz-kompetenz63 the court would not
have answered this jurisdictional question, the arbitrator(s) would have done so.64
The court could have given even more deference to arbitration by concluding that
the arbitrator, not the court, should decide if the opt-out agreement was valid. When
arbitrators are given the power to determine their own jurisdiction (i.e., whether an
60

Tillman, 735 F.3d at 462.

61

Id.

62

Tillman, 735 F.3d at 457.

63

Kompetenz-kompetenz is a principle which parties may choose to incorporate into their arbitration
agreements, but which is not part of U.S. law per se. See China Minmetals Materials Imp. & Exp. Co., Ltd.
v. Chi Mei Corp., 334 F.3d 274, 287 (3d Cir. N.J. 2003).
64

Id. at 276 (holding that under kompetenz-kompetenz an arbitrator can examine his or her own
jurisdiction without interference by a court).

128

arbitration agreement exists), they will be more likely to find an agreement, or else they
would lose the opportunity to arbitrate the claim.
B.  The Solution InSTORE program is an example of an adhesive contract.
Adhesive contracts have been a point of controversy in the progression of
arbitration.65 The Sixth Circuit did not address the concept of adhesion when it discussed
the arbitration agreement in Tillman. Although, the agreement in Tillman is adhesive, it
was placed on the weaker party, the employee, by the much stronger and sophisticated
party, the employer. While the agreement did have the option of opting out of arbitration,
without consequence to employment, employees did not have the power or ability to
change any terms of the agreement.66 The agreement was offered to employees on a takeit-or-leave-it basis, mimicking the characteristics of an adhesive contract.
The court focused on the circumstances surrounding the agreement to determine if
notice was fair, similar to the determination of whether a contract is conscionable.67 In
adhesive arbitration contacts, courts look to the procedural and substantive
conscionability of the contract to determine if the contract is enforceable.68 Procedural
conscionability looks to the circumstances and the process of contract formation.69
Substantive conscionability looks to the terms the agreement itself and whether deception
or ambiguous language was used.70 Although the Sixth Circuit did not state that it was
using a conscionability test, its process mirrored such a test. The court looked to the
circumstances exposing Tillman to the arbitration agreement.71 The court also used the
language of the agreement to find that it was written clearly to convey what the
agreement was.72
The Sixth Circuit focused on how “fair” the formation of the arbitration
agreement was, but did not consider the terms of the arbitration agreement. Although
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employees had the option of opting-out, ninety-seven percent of employees did not.73 In
order to have an adhesive contract, like the one in Tillman upheld, more about the
agreement should be known. For an arbitral employment agreement like this one to be
considered “fair,” the stronger party should bear most of the expenses of arbitration;
selection of the arbitrator(s) should not favor the stronger party; and the location of the
arbitration should be convenient for the weaker party.
C.  Opt-out and opt-in contracts benefit opposite parties to arbitration.
The alternative to an opt-out arbitration agreement is an opt-in arbitration
agreement. There is more of a burden on the employer if an opt-in agreement is used.
The likelihood of participation in the agreement will most likely be less than an opt-out
agreement, since a party must take some sort of independent action in order to opt-out.
But there is more protection to employees in opt-in agreements, these employees must
make a conscience decision to choose arbitration and then act on their decision. The Sixth
Circuit in Tillman did not attempt to balance these considerations. The court in Tillman
only addressed opt-in contracts to state that opt-out contracts are acceptable under
Michigan law.74
The arbitration agreement in Tillman specifically stated that employment
discrimination claims were to be arbitrated. 75 The Sixth Circuit used a five factor test to
determine if the Plaintiff had knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to litigate civil
rights claims arising from her employment.76 Although arbitration has been expanded to
legally cover statutory claims, even civil rights claims,77 this decision expands
arbitration’s coverage even further. Under Tillman, employees can waive their right to
litigate civil rights claims through an adhesive opt-out arbitration clause.78
D.  Unanswered questions after Tillman.
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the time frame Tillman had to opt-out gave her
ample time to consult an attorney.79 This language seems to support that employees have
a duty to consult an attorney when given paperwork from their employment on
arbitration. This seems to be a large burden for low level employees.
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Attorneys are not cheap, and the time to find and consult an attorney can be costly
as well. It is an easier task to do personal research on the topic of arbitration, which the
court also encouraged.80 The Tillman court noted that the agreement itself included
resources for learning information on arbitration.81 What is unclear from this decision is
the extent to which an employee has a duty to pursue information on arbitration and to
which an employer is responsible for providing that information.
In Tillman, Macy’s took four steps in order to notify the Plaintiff of the opt-out
arbitration agreement.82 These steps included mailers, a video, an informational meeting,
and electronic communication.83 The court held that combined, these steps provided
sufficient notification to the Plaintiff of the arbitral clause.84
What is unclear from this decision is how many steps and what kind of
communications are necessary, at a bare minimum, to provide notice of an opt-out
arbitration agreement in the Sixth Circuit. The Sixth Circuit has had several opinions
addressing notice, but if the court adopted a bright line rule for notice, it would not have
to continue addressing the issue. After this decision, employers may adopt an identical or
very similar process to Macy’s Solution InSTORE program in order to ensure that, if
challenged on notice, the Sixth Circuit will uphold the arbitration agreement.
VI.  

CONCLUSION

In Tillman, the Sixth Circuit upheld an adhesive opt-out arbitral agreement
between a highly sophisticated employer and its employee. The court stated that the
inclusive agreement covered arbitration of all matters pertaining to employment,
including civil rights claims.85 This decision favors employers and corporations, allowing
for employees to waive their right to a jury trial for all possible future claims arising from
their employment. Based on the decision in Tillman, employers, specifically in the Sixth
Circuit, will likely adopt opt-out arbitration clauses with their employees. If these
employers follow a basic and fair notification policy, as outlined in Tillman, these
arbitration clauses are likely to be binding.86
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